Th is paper studies the electricity mark et design long run problem of ensur ing enoug h ge ne ration ca pac ity to meet fut ure dem and (resource adequacy ). Reform pr ocesses worldwide have show n th at it is di fficult for th e market alone to provide incenti ves to attrac t enoug h investment in capacity reserves due to technical and institutional features. We study seve ra l mea sur es that hav e been proposed internationally to cop e with thi s prob lem including strategic reserv es , capacity pa yments, capacity requirem ents , and call options. Th e analytical and practical strengt hs and weakn esses of each approach are discu ssed .
INTRODUCTION
Th e electricit y power crises in Ca lifornia, New Yo rk, Ital y, Norway, Swede n, Brazil, A rgentina, Chile and New Zealand in the past few yea rs have dramaticall y showed the importanc e of a reliable electricity supply .' As of 2000, generation reserves had declined in most markets since liberalization.
2
A ver age reser ves have also decrea sed in mo st lEA mark ets except for the UK. An ex treme case is Au strali a wh ere there was signifi ca nt initial overcapacity but reserves drop significantly a fter the reform. In the cases of UK , Sweden and in Pennsyl vania, Ne w Jersey, Maryland (PJM), reserv es in 2000 staye d sim ilar to those observed at the tim e of the origina l reform, but in Norway th er e was a decrease of 2% from 1991 to 2000, and in Ca lifornia a decr ea se of 7.5% fro m 1990 to 1998 . Th e change in rese rve margin s has occurred , in most cases, from a sta rting point of large reserves so that cur rent rese rves ge nerally remain above 16% , which see ms acce ptab le for rel iab ility purposes. Likewise, severa l of the exa mples of e lectricity crises have bee n in syste ms that depend heavily upon hydrop ow er. Ho wever, there is a grow ing conce rn on whethe r liberalized mark ets will be able to provide adeq uate incenti ves for sufficient investme nt in ge neratio n capacity. T his is particul arl y prob lematic du e to some intrinsic characteristics of electric ity markets suc h as: a ) a sho rt-term ine lastic demand th at impli es th at the (lon g-t erm ) supply-demand balance ca nnot be ac hieve d through a market-clearing price; b) a lack of forward electricity mark ets beyond one or two yea rs; c) the favorable arena for strateg ic beh avior due to the diffi culty to get mark et clearing pri ces in tight situations, and d) final co nsume rs do not fee l the need to engage in long-t erm co ntrac ts because they ar e usua lly isolated from spot prices by regulated tariffs .. 1 Likewi se , mark ets with particular regulatory pol icies -imp lying, for exa mple, price caps and 1 Rel iability in elec tricity markets is usually under stood as the sum of adequacy and sec urity standards. Ade quac y (securi ty) is generally assoc iated wi th the long ru n (s hort run). Sec urity de scribes the abi lity of the system to deal with co ntingenc ies. whi le adeq uacy refe rs to the ab ility of the sys tem to meet the aggregate co ns umer energy req uire me nts at al l times. Sec urity include s the so cal led anci llary services (vo ltage support , reg ulation capacity, spinning reserve s. black start capability.
etc. ). Sec Sing h (2002). and Or en (2003).
2 The annex pre sent s data on ge nerating reser ves for lEA coun tries 3 See Bouttes (2004 ). and Vazq uez et al (2002 ). De Vries and Ne uhoff (2003 carry out an exten sive anal y sis of the ma rket and institu tional failures in the e lectricity industry that imped e the development of long-term con trac ts inc ludin g: lack of gen erators ' counterpart ies to sign long-term con tract s. produ cers' imperfect information of the demand function, reg ula tory uncertainty on whether the regu lator wi ll impose price caps in per iods of price sp ikes. investment cyc les due to long-lead times for new ge neratio n fac ilities, ge nerators mar ket power, and so forth.
artific ially elastic con sum er s--might require resource ade quacy mech ani sm s to return capital to investor s in electricity plants. ' Several measures have been proposed to ensure a suffic ient amo unt of ge neration capac ity reserves. As shown in figure I, such measur es m ight be ana lyze d in term s of their degr ee of ce ntra lization or decent ralization wi th regards to the {III/Oli n! of capacity and the p rice of capac ity (see Knops, 2002, and De Vr ies, 2004 ) . In this pap er , we ca rry out an ana lys is of each one of these measures both study ing the ir theoretical fundaments as well as thei r intern ation al application and assessme nt. Th erefore, a market with high price caps wo uld typica lly not need supply requireme nts. The question of co urse is with rega rds to the price ca p level that would not ca use reso urce ade quacy prob lems, As discussed be lo w, sim ulations for the PJiv1 market show that price spikes that migh t occur in an energy on ly market are way above the S 1,000 price cap set for PJM. even when combined wit h an interruptibl e service policy (see Bu shne ll. 2005 ).
TOTALLY CEN TRA LIZED VS. TOTALL Y ECENTRALIZED RESOURCE ADEQUACY
We start ana lyz ing two extre me approac hes to reso urce ade quacy an d investment in cap acity reserves. One ex treme is a fully ce ntra lize d so lution whe re a vert ically integr ated utility centrally deals w ith imbalan ces and manages conges tion and ancillary serv ices using its own ge neration resourc es. Thi s is the "whee ling" mod el that is utilized in the United States in areas that have not gone into a co mpetitive structure and that have no spot mark et (Hunt, 2002 ) . Th e Mexican mo de l is another exa mple of ce ntra lized supply adequacy where private independ ent power produ cers (IPPs) se ll their energy to the state mon opsony CFE und er lon g-term power purc hase agree me nts that are supported by governme nt funds."
Anothe r ce ntra lized alternative is the crea tio n of a " moth ball" (or strategic) reserve wit h government subsi dy, and ce ntra lized dec isions regarding both amo unt and price of ca pacity (see figure I) . T he moth ba ll reserve woul d imp ly a strategic reserve of generation capacity," wit h an operation centrally controlled by the government that wou ld only be used du ring emergencies. There is of course a social cost to this procedure since subsidies wo uld be financed thro ug h public funds at large. Supp ly of capacity reserves wo uld then be categorized as a publi c service ob liga tio n (Knops, 2002). 7 An opposite extre me approach to reso urce adequacy is a fully decent ralized so lution where the market determin es the amount and price of ca pac ity resource that wi ll gra nt resource adequacy. Unde r suc h a so lution, the di fferent ene rgy mark ets wo uld be separated and a seque ntial equi librium would theor eti call y be reach ed in the spot market, the forward ene rgy market, the mark et for capac ity reser ves, and the forw ard tran smi ssion mark et through the vo luntary parti cipation of age nts and a minimal superv ision of an Indep endent System Opera to r (ISO ) (W ilson, 2002) .
Different decent rali zed mode ls have been tried internation ally as in Texas, Ca liforn ia, Aust ralian Victoria pool, and NETA in the United 5 Sec Carreon-Rodria uez. et al (200 6). and Madrigal and de Rosen zw eig (2003 ) .
(, In Norway and SW~den there is dir ect own ership of some peakin g plant s ( Giillcn. 2000) . 7 In Mexico . most ge neration unit s operate at low factor plant s. T his could be interpr eted as a sort of moth-ball strategy so that some spare capacity is strateg ica lly reser ved in the general system. However. the low factor pl ant s could also be interpr eted as part of CFE' s monopoli stic behaviour. In any case, low factor plants does not necessarily have a dir ect re lation ship with ince ntives within the pri vat e generation scheme based on IPP proj ects that are bid by the C FE. and that must co mpulsory se ll all their ener gy to such a publ ic monopoly.
Kin gd om ." Th e aim has been in some ca ses (NET A) to get the system operator out of the spot market s, so that traders mana ge the spot mark et as well as man age co nges tion, and separate ar rangement s are set up for anci llary services . Typica lly, the primary inco me for recovery of ca pac ity cos ts is the differenc e between the market clea ring price and the ge nerators ' margina l co st (sca rcity paym ent s ).
A basic probl em of a decen tralized model is precise ly that it ends up creating pri vat e markets not on ly for spot energy , but a lso markets for con gestion energy, markets for imbalance energy , and markets for anc illary services (Hunt, 2002 ) . All these markets deal with the same energy produ ct, and in an effic ient mark et all these products would end up being traded at the same price." In reality, these pr ices do not converge, and alternat ive ly higher prices, sho rtages, bureaucracy and new tran saction costs are create d.
In fact , who lesale market designs that separate energy and indi vidua l anc illary service ma rkets have performed poorly and have made electri city mark ets subj ect to uni latera l beh avior that lead s to pri ce increases (Jo sko w, 2003 ) . California did an ac tua l sepa ration of five elec tricity mark ets (Hunt. 200 2) . So me theoretical studies try to find the optimality con dit ions for such an approach (W ilso n, 2002 , and W ilso n, 2002) . Ho wever elegant in theo ry, \ 0 the elect ricity indu stry practic e has clea rly shown the incon ven ience of sepa rat ing the differe nt market s.
E lectricity mark ets do not fu lfill the conditions for fu ll competition to wo rk, so that decentralized se quential and effic ien t equi libr ium of the different e lect ric ity market s is practically impo ssib le (Borens te in, 200 2) . Marke t power and volatility ar e really inherent to e lec trici ty markets since dem and is di fficul t to forecast and inelastic. Likew ise, electricity supply faces S In England and Wales the existing integrated system was substituted with an extreme version of a decentralized model that discourages the use of imbalances and trading in markets remote from the system operator (New Electricity Trading Arrangements or ' ETA). According to Hunt (2002) . this implies a reduction in the transparency of energy markets because imbalance prices do not reflect efficient contract prices. 9 This is theoretically confirmed by Carreon-Rodriguez and Rosellen (2005) which show that prices in the capacity reserves. peak capacity and non-peak capacity markets converge to the same price in a model that separates these three markets. 10 For example. Chao and Wilson (2002) analyze the two-part Californ ian procurement auction for the market of spinning reserves. One part of the auction was designed for making capacity available. while the other part was for supplying incremental energy. A scoring rule is meant for comparing bids. while a settlement rule is used for paying accepted bids.
The revelation principle applied to this model makes each supplier's optimal-energy bid reveal his true marginal cost. Additionally. the ISO and the generators are not required to agree on the probability distribution of dispatched energy binding constraints at peak times, and it is inelast ic and very costly to store. II Th is implies that sho rt-term prices are extreme ly volatile so that sma ll changes in demand or supply conditions lead to pri ce bursts, and even sma llshare ge ne rators can exe rcise mark et power. Bor en stein then claims that the best way th at regulators ca n handle mark et power is through lon g-t erm forward contracts bet ween power buyers and selle rs together with real-time pricing. Forward contracts help to lower the average pric e paid in both spot and forward markets, whil e real-time pri cin g also mak es the demand curve flatter. 12 Another mark et-based mechanism for resource adequ acy could be based on subscription of cap acit y (Knops, 2002) . The desired ge neration cap acity would be decentrally determined (see figure I ). Wh en demand approac hes supply, every consumer is restricted to the peak capacit y contracted in adva nce from ge nerators. Peak capacity can be so ld by each ge nerator in any amount, and the pric e for thi s ca pac ity is le ft to th e market. W ith thi s so lution both the pric e and the quan tity of peak capacity would also be decentrall y determ ined .
13 However, at this moment , suc h a so lution is not technicall y feasible.
In the contex t of an integrated ISO that reac hes a ce ntra lized equilibrium in a ll the electricity markets, De Vries and Ne uhoff (2003) analyze the " energy-only" mar ket solution. Such a so lution rel ies on the spot mark et run by the ISO to tak e ca re of resou rce adeq uac y so that price spi kes signa l the need of investm ent in ge neration capacit y. De Vries and Neuhoff I I This non stora b le nature of e lectric ity is what mainl y differentiates electr icity mark ets fro m ot her energy markets (such as natural gas and oil), Such a peculi ar cha rac teristic of e lectricity impli es a compl ex sys tem of dep end ent markets (th e spot mark et. the forward energy mark et, the forward tran smi ssion mark et. and offco ursc thc ma rket for cap acit y reserves ) whose seq uential equilibrium is very hard to ac hieve in practi ce without a centralize d ISO. However, thc need to regul ate electr ici ty markets might as well be dri ven by re luctance from the j urisdict ion to pass th rough wholesale prices into retail rates that arc not " politically acceptab le" , I~Most of the recen t electricity ref0 1111 proposals also promot e the use of dem and side bidding measures (se e, for examp le, Co mmonwea lth of Australia. 2002) 13 Ca rreon-Rodriguez and Roselle n (2005) develop a two-stage oligopolistic model where ge ne rators decide first if they sho uld enter to the long-term reserv es market or the spot market. If they go into the spo t mar ket. they decid e in the sec ond stage to supply eithe r pea k or non -peak ca pac ity. Th er efore. both amoun t and price of long-ru n cap acit y reserves and peak ca pac ity arc set in the market. Also in a theoretical framework, Murp hy and Sme ers (2002) build a closed -loop COUIllOt two stage ga mc that desc ribes a situa tion where investments in ca pac ity reser ves are decided in a first stage wh ile sa les in the spo t market occ ur in a sec ond stage . Both stag es take plac e in o ligopo listic markets. Their fra mewor k does not include forward contracting. They find non-conv exities in the first stage of the pro blem (a fact co mmon of bi-Ieve l programs ) bu t are ab le to co nc lude that a model with a spot market has low er pric es and higher quantities than a mod el witho ut a spot market.
argue that there are insu ffic ient incentives for ge nerators in an ene rgy-on ly market to invest in capacity w henever the re exist economic uncerta inty or fluct uations in demand. Moreover, they show that w hen ge nerators and co nsumers are risk averse, the optimal leve l of investmen t from the perspecti ve of ge nerators is below the level consum ers wis h to finan ce with long-t erm co ntrac ts . Th e ma in reason is that mark et design s do not have the institutions that permit long-term contracts to develop suffi cientl y, and ge nerators are restricted in the amount of risk that the y can tran sfer to con sumer s. Lik ewi se, co mplete relian ce on pri ce spikes is not ad visabl e becau se th ey are usuall y not "po litically acc ept abl e," and they ca n a lso be manipul ated by generation co mpa nies. For exa mple, if the probabil ity of lost load in the PJM market is I day in 10 years, pr ice sp ikes in the ran ge of $ 12,000-$30,000 per Mwh are needed in an energy-o nly market. T he political accepta nce of thi s price ran ge might be analyze d w hen compared with a $ 1,000 regul atory pri ce cap." Even more, elec tric ity mark ets that rely on short-term energy revenues mi ght lead to shortfalls in capacity over time that might ori ginate inv estment cycl es wh ere inv estment lags demand in the mark et. Thi s is a char act eristic mainly tru e of electricity markets onl y, due to the sequential equilibrium of suc h mark ets and to the non-storabl e nature of the electricity go od. Regul ator s wor ldwi de are then very concerned that energy prices are not enoug h to cover ge nerators ' ca paci ty cos ts, due to both theoret ical and practical reason s. M ost mar kets have impl ement ed some typ e of resource adequacy measure . Texas has recently changed to generation adequacy ass ura nces , and FERC' s Sta nda rd M arket Design (SMD) also recog nize d the adequ ate contracted provision of ca pacity reserves (FE RC, 2002) .15 Ca liforn ia in 200 I also cha nged its market approach to capa cit y supply and prompted a proposal for an avai labl e capacit y requirem ent (ACAP) to be imposed on load se rving entities (LSEs).
It is therefo re not surp rising that severa l meth od s have been formall y studied in the literature on ince ntives for investment in reser ve capacity such as capacity pay me nts, capacity requirements, and ca pacity op tio ns. T he literature on resource adeq uacy ana lyzes these mechan ism s in the contex t of an integrated ISO. We next study suc h mech ani sm s.
CAPACITY PAYMENTS
Ca pacity paym ent s provide remune ration to ge nerat ors for making available their ge neration ca pa city (whether they ge t di spatch ed or not) . Th e price of capacity is set whil e the market determines the amount of cap acity available. That is, pric es are ce ntra lly determ ined whi le capacity decisio ns are decentralized (see figure I ) . Capac ity payments are co llect ed fro m co nsumer s thro ug h an upl ift cha rge and determine th e cost behavior of the firm but leave the amou nt of reserves uncert ai n. Capac ity paym ents are rooted in the th eory of peak -load pric ing so that energy is priced at margi nal cost, and a cap acity paym ent is used to recover the fixed capacity co st impo sed on peak-period energy users (Oren, 2003) . Th e optimality condition is such that the shadow pric e of the cap acit y constra int is equa l to the incr em ent al cost of capa cit y .
Capacity paym ent s have been used in Argentina," Chile, Co lombia, Peru , Spa in (togeth er with bilateral capacit y co ntrac ts ), and th e U nited Kingd om ." Two di fferent kind s of capaci ty payme nts have been applied in the internationa l practic e: fixe d payments and fluctu at ing paym ent s. Fixed per MW pay ments have been imp leme nted in Spa in, where the compe nsa tion dep end s on the ava ilabi lity and the techn ology of the power plant, and in Arge ntina, whe re the Secre taria de Energia set a $ 10 MWH ($5 for base ca pacity and $5 for reli ability) paym ent paid during pea k dem and blo ck s (6am-11 pm during wo rkdays).
Fluctuating pa ym ent s va ry with the need for rese rve d capacit y . Althoug h later rescinded und er NETA, they were impl em ented in the ea rly UK (Engla nd and Wales) e lectricity ma rket. Th e mark et merit-o rder pricin g rule was mod ified during periods of high demand wh en reserve capac ity margins were low . In such circumstance, the ma rket pric e was defi ned as the weighted average of two factors: the pric e of the last accepted offer to ge nerate (LAO) and the va lue of lost load (VOLL) . T he weight is the LOLP.
The formu la for the market pri ce is then market price = LA0 * (i-LOLP) + VOLL * LOLP, wh ere: 0 ::; LOLP ::; I. Th e greater (lower) the sur plus reserve capacity the smaller (higher ) is LOLP. Generators would ideall y add capacity whe n the expec ted sum of all these paym ents ove r all hours of th e yea r is greater than the co st of instal ling new cap acity. Thi s formula also implies a price ca p for VOLL when th e sys tem is sho rt of power.
A ge nera l assessment of capac ity pay ments is that they do not a lways favo r co mpet ition because they tend to crea te artific ial rents that might lead to increased mark et power in ge neration. In a simp le Co ur not mode l, Ca rreo nRodrigu ez and Rose1l6n (20 05) find the conditio ns under which a flu ctu atin g 16 Arge ntina change d to a capaci ty ma rket in 2000. I i With the ado ptio n of "NETA" in October 2000, the UK abando ned capac ity paym ent s base d on the loss of load prob ability (LOL P) meth od along with the pool system. ca pac ity paym ent (as the one put in practice in the UK) might lead to worse res ults in term s of co nsumer surp lus, profits and net social benefit s compared to a sy ste m where the mark et pri ce is not artific ially increased and excess demand is satisfi ed in a reg ulate d reserve (or standby) market." T hey show that imp lementation of a bypass reserve market make s social sense in terms of prices on ly if there is a large efficiency gap between old and new ge neration plants. In suc h a case, the impleme nta tion of the capacity-payment so lut ion wo uld only create artific ially high rents that could provid e incentives for a development of oligo po listic generatio n markets." In a similar effort, Joskow and Ti role (2004 ) ana lyze the effects of an upli ft charge of an ISO to recover the costs of resources. They do so in the context of a general model that studies the effects on the theorems of we lfare economics of market failures as those existing in e lectric ity marke ts. T hey find th at ca paci ty paym ents grant ine fficient result s:
• When the upl ift charge is applied both to peak and off-pea k pe riods, large ISO purchases discour age the build up of base load capacity an d push down the peak pr ice . • For sma ll purchases, off-peak capacity decreases w hen the u plift is applied in both pea k and off peak periods, and the peak ca pac ity decreases wh en the upli ft is only applied during th e peak period.
In a mod el of imperfect infor ma tio n, Oren and Sios ha nsi (2003) ana lyze payme nts for reserve capacity in a joint day -ahead energy and reserves auction . Reserves are procured thro ug h the energy market using energy onl y bids, and ca paci ty paym ent s are mad e based on the ge nerato r's opportunity cost. The reve lation principl e is applied to show that ge nerators have an incenti ve to und erstate their cos ts so as to ca pture high er ca pac ity rents." Suc h theoretical assessments are confirmed in prac tice by the case of Argenti na that substitute d its fixed capacity pay ment mec han ism for a hybrid sy stem of payments and contracts because fixed payments were found to d istor t the merit or der dispatc h, and negative ly affec ted the lon g-term financi al situation of therm al ge nerato rs. In the UK , the LOLP sys tem was manipulated by large players at the end of th e pre -N ETA period." In several other co untr ies, capacity pay ments have also led to co nstruct ion of inefficient IS A sim ilar approach to a standby market wa s applied in Victoria. Au strali a. with obligation s to ens ure capa city in an energy-only m arket. 19 The ma the ma tica l de riva tio n of these results is prese nted in the annex . See also Bar za lobre (2000) . 20 See al so J ewbcrv ( 1995 ) . 21 See G ree n (2004'). peakin g unit s, promote the use of one fue l ove r othe rs, and eliminated the ince ntive for availability during crisis of deficit supply.
likewi se, as in any pric e-cap procedure, setting the optimal level of cap acit y paym ent s is ve ry diffi cult (Singh , 2002) . In Great Britain, during the pre-NETA period, the ca lculation of the lOlP suffered seve ral flaws that overestimated the probability of losing load ,n and und erestimated the VOlL. Thi s wa s a political strategic choice to provide ge ne rators with a constant flow of revenues so that capac ity payment s made investments in power plants eas ier. In Australia, VOl.L was substanti ally increa sed to mak e peaking capacity commercial.
A pra ctic al problem of fluctuating cap acit y payment s is that variations in such mechani sm happ en in the short run, whereas the relevant tim e for investm ent in cap acit y reser ves is the long term (Knops, 2002 ) . Additionally, the l OlP method is not adeq uate for largely hydr o-based systems (as Brazil) as the lOlP wo uld be very sma ll durin g wet seas ons, whi ch would lead to disprop ort ionate low revenu es for therm al ge nerators (Gillen, 2002) . Th erefore, any capac ity adde r should be designed to reflect the value of the plant to the sys te m, which is in turn affected by the technology plant co mpos ition in suc h a system (Hunt, 2002) .
Capaci ty payment s might be combined with price caps to protect consumers because wh en capac ity is paid separa te ly, there is no need that pr ice spikes remunerate reser ve capac ity (l EA, 2002). The result of such combination could be a redu ction in price volatility w ithout affecting average prices and reserv es (Hobbs et a l, 2002) . Ho wever, price caps can also have a locational influenc e on ge nerators that would see k high pric e-cap areas.
Notwithstanding its inconveniences, man y sources believe that a capacity paym ent system --togeth er with an ISO pool design--is superior to the new NET A system for the UK at lea st with regards to resource adequacy. Such a combination " .. .is clo se to the Standard Market Design (SMD) recommendations of the FER C, whi ch Hunt (2002) cons iders as the 'c lear mark et design winner " (Roques et aI, 2004) . Likewise, a comparative study carr ied out by the Council of Austral ian Government s in ord er to eva luate the Australian nat ional e lectricity market concluded that their capacity paym ent sys tem fares we ll w he n compared to mark et designs in PJM , Nordpoo l, and (especially) NETA (Co mmo nwea lth of Austra lia, 2002). 22 Capac ity act uall y avail ab le and di spatched at peak times was therefore underesti mate d.
wh ich in turn faci litat ed ga m ing behavio ur by generators. Ot her flaws inc luded: the calc ulatio n of lOl P used avera ge avai lability (ignoring that plants are typ icall y fully ava ilable at peak times but less avai lable off peak) . and the lOlP software looked at abso lute (rather than relative) differe nces between generation and demand eve n during the sum me r and as on a winter peak. VO ll was underestimated in part beca use a ge neric VO II was used for all co nsumers ( Roques et a l, 2004) .
CAPACITY REQU IREMENTS
Capac ity requirements are se t as an ob Iigation to ma intain a certain amount of reserv e cap acit y. Such an amount is cent ra lly det ermined throu gh an ad m inistrative ly forecast of dem and . and is usually imposed by the ISO (or the regul ator) to LSEs. Conve rse ly to ca pac ity paym ent s. the price is decentrall y determined by th e market onc e the amount of reser ve capacity is set (see figure I ) . LS Es must buy enoug h " capacity tick et s" to meet the expec ted peak load of their cu stomers mult iplied by ( I+X) , where X is the ex pected reserve margin that wil l cover an estima ted level of reliabil ity to cop e with rand om out ages. T he tick ets are so ld by ge nera tors w ho are usually allowe d to export thei r rese rve capacity to other mark ets. Wi th a ca paci ty require me nt, the regul ator is able to contro l the reserve leve l but the cost remains uncertain (l EA , 2002 ) Capa city requ irem ent s are used in PJM, New Yo rk and New England market s where an oblig ati on is impo sed on LSE s to arr ange for Installed Capac ity (l CAP) . In particul ar, PJM put into practice a bid-based, day-ah ead and month-ahead ICAP mar kets.r' LSEs are required to bu y ICAP in order to be abl e to serve load s, and the y can trade their ICAP with oth er LSEs. Th e ICAP req uirements can be met by LSEs thro ugh se lf supply, bi latera l transactions with supplie rs, capability period auctio ns (several-mo nth strip), month ly auction s, deficienc y-spot mark et auc tions, and so forth. Capacity resources can be ex ported from (or imported to) the PJM area. Ge nerators se ll a rec all right that ena bles PJM to recall energy exports from ca pac ity resources when requi red . W hen ca pac ity is recall ed , the supp lier is paid the mark et pr ice for ene rgy. Th e sys tem operator determi nes dem and throu gh the choice of ob ligatio ns of LSEs, which must own or purch ase cap acit y reso urc es great er tha n or equal to their expected peak-load plus a reserve margin. If an LSE is short of capa cit y, it pays a penalty that equa ls the daily amount of defi cien cy in ca pa city tim es the number of days. Wh en the sys tem itself is short of cap acit y, the deficiency charge is the double of the capacity deficien cy rate (e qual to US D 174.73 per MW-day in 2003 ).24
Long-t erm reserves ca n also be viewe d as price insurance and be treated as a pri vate good but wit hi n the framework of a centra lized provision of the ISO th at impo ses mandatory levels of suc h insurance on LS Es (Ore n, 2003). Th ese mand atory m les would co mpensa te for severa l obstac les that co nsumers face whe n choos ing an adeq uate level of pro tection, suc h as 2, On October I. 1998, P.lM initiated month ly and multi-monthly capacity markets, while daily capac ity markets initiated their operation in 1999. techn ological barr iers on meteri ng control, po litica l bar riers to se t electric ity tariffs efficiently, and so forth, For a market base on operating rese rves back ed by high pri ces, Stoft (200 2) shows that optima l investment in generation cap acity dep end s o n the inverse relationsh ip between capacity requirement s and the purcha se pr ice limit on the syst em operator: the higher the reserve requirem ent the lower the optimal pric e limit."
A theor etical analy sis of the PJM-ICAP mark et is provided in Creti and Fabra (2004) . Th ey build a two-stage game theor y mod el. In the first stage, prior to the realization of demand, ge nerators compete in the capacity market and receive thei r payment s for the capacity amounts they commit. In the seco nd stag e, on ce demand is realized, ge nerators compete in the domestic and foreign mark ets. When there is excess demand , the regu lator recall s the suppliers ' co m mitted capac ity resou rces, which are paid at market pri ces. Finally, supp liers ge t their paym ent s for the energy sold.
Creti an d Fabra ana lyze this ga me for the monopoly and the perfect co mpeti tion cases, and also study the role of the regulator in choos ing the capacity requireme nt as we ll as in setting a capacity price cap . Cret i and Fab ra derive several res ults from their model on :
• Th e opportunity cos ts of committing capacity resources.
• Th e firm ' s optima l behavior in the capac ity market.
• Th e regul ator optima l decisio ns rega rding capac ity pric e caps and the optimal reserve requiremen t.
In a first re sult , they show the trad e-off that a ge nerator face s between committing more resourc es to the capacity mark et again st the foregon e revenu es from exports (in the case of being recalled) . Th e differenc e between the foreign and dom estic prices then determines the opportunity cost of committing capacit y resources." The second result shows that two typ es of equilibria are po ssible for the firm ' s optimal behavio r given the va lue o f the capaci ty pric e cap , and the reserve requirement set by the regulato r. Wh en the price cap is too " low", the ge nerator's opportunity costs wi ll not be covered and a capac ity deficit would arise tcapacitv deficit equilibrium ). When the pr ice cap is " high" eno ugh capaci ty reso urces are able to cover the needed 25 Stoft (2002) also shows that in a perfect ly co mpetiti ve mark et a pric e cap equal to the average value of lost load results in an optimal level of investment in generatio n capacity. Ford (1999), and Hobbs et a l. (2001) also discuss the need for price cap s when markets do not clear. 26 More spec ifically, the opportun ity cost is also a funct ion of the pro babi lity of reca ll, the amo unt of resources needed by the system to ass ure reso urc e adeq uacy , and the inte nsity of price co mpe tition in the ene rgy market.
capacity requirement (market clearing eqll i lihr iIlJII ).27
Finally, C reti and Fab ra show that the regul ator should a lway s set the ca pacity req uirement equal to peak demand so as to fully av oid the risk of sho rtage, and to se t the capacity price ca p equa l to the firm ' s opp ortunity cos ts of pro vidin g full capac ity co mmitme nt.
Creti and Fabra 's result s show the frag ility of the ICAP sys tem, which crucia lly depend s on the capac ity pri ce cap, and the capacity requirement. The administrative calculation of the latter variable is a sub jective one," whi le the opt imality of the for mer variable depends on the mark et structure of financ ial transm iss ion right s (FTRs) since the opportunity cost of the gen erator is given by the pri ce differ enc e betw een the dom estic and fore ign markets: if the FTR is subject to market power that w ill be reflected in the ICAP mar ket.
In practic e, ICAP mech an ism s have genera lly fail ed to pro vid e investment signa ls when they are mo st needed . ICA P markets were subject to market ma nipulat ion" tha t cause d pri ce spikes in 2000 in PJM . T he poo l was deficient some days in Jun e, Ju ly and Au gu st 2000 since owner s of cap acit y increased their ex ports for periods when ex terna l pri ces surpass ed the PJM market price. In January 200 1, there were price spikes of m ore than $300 MW-day w ith a deficiency in sys te m capaci ty. Furthe rmo re, high market concentration in ca pa city owners hip has also been observed .
For New England, Joskow (2003) showed that the scarcity rents generated wer e far be low from what wou ld be necessary to attract reserve "peaking" cap acit y to invest (or continue ope ration ) so as to supply the needed ope rating reserves and energy during sca rcity co nditions . Th e average sca rc ity rent s in New Eng land of $ 10,000 Mw-Year are ve ry low compared to "; Joskow and Tirolc (2 004) also build a mod el that shows how a co mb ina tion of ca pac ity req uire ments with cap aci ty pri ce caps might potential ly restore inve stm ent incentives. Eve n in the presen ce of market pow er, a ( Ramsey) optimum ca n be ac hieved when: (i) LSE capacity requiremen ts ca n be met both by peak and base lo ad ge nerators. ( ii) capacity requirem ents arc determined using the demand from all co nsume rs. and the capacity prices reflect thc price s paid by all retail co nsu mers. and (iii) thc ma rket for peaki ng capacity is co nte stable . However, this result is not tru e when th ere are more than three state s of natu re (where two state of natu re arc "o ff-peak' and "p eak" ), In such a case, strict price-cap reg ulation might be used to allev iate market pow er off-peak and allow pcakcrs to reco ver their investm ent (Jo skow and Ti ro lc, 2004. pp , 45 -46) . "8 There have bee n efforts to impro ve the ca lcu lation of the ca pac ity require me nt. For exa mple.
in the lew York ISO a dema nd curve wa s proposed to be con structed as an alternative to an ICAP market. T he intention was to increase res ource re liabi lity by val uing add itiona l IC A P above the fixed capacity requirement ( Harvard Elect ric ity Policy Gro up. 2003) .
"9ICAP gives ince ntive s in thc short run for man ipul ating the avai lability of plan ts to increase rev enue. Antico mpe titive behavior is potent iall y high er wh en ca paci ty and sys tem co nstraints arc binding. Such effects ar c magnified by the typi cal high inelasticit y of both the supply and demand curve s o f electric ity ma rkets, Anothe r practi cal prob lem of ICAP is the interaction amo ng sys tems with and witho ut ca pacit y requirements, wh ich might lead to ineffic ient distortions (lEA . 2002) .
the fixed cost of a new combust ion tur bine bui lt to provide reserve capacity estimated in between $60,000-$80,000 Mw -year. T his mean s that the combi natio n of an ISO spot market w ith ICAP markets has not been ca pable to provide eno ug h incent ives to attrac t ge nerat ing ca pac ity to maintain adequate re liability levels. Simi lar res ults have been obta ined for the New York ISO (Patton, 2002 ) .
The ICAP sys tem is usuall y flaw ed in part becau se it derives fro m short-term adequacy conce rns rather than long-term, and since it depends on a subjective estima tion of a " rig ht" capac ity level wh ich depend s on ge ne ration stocks. fue l pri ces, load shapes , and elasticity of dem and for reser ves. A lso, since ICAP is combined w ith the possibility of ex po rtation of capacity, the va lue of the ICAP depends on the pr ice differen ces across the adjacent markets. Furthermore, ICAP s have not provi ded incent ives to bu ild new ge neration facil ities and, co nve rsely, have co ntri bute d to keep o ld inefficient plants in place (Harvard Electricity Policy Group, 2003) ..10 FERC's original SM D also crit icized ICAP requi rements and proposed instead the use of resource adequacy requi reme nts wit h targete d curtailments, penalties for undercon tracting, and long-t erm contracti ng mandatory measures (FE RC, 2002) . Th is is a furt her flawed po licy because there is no objective wa y to solve th e resource-adequacy problem in accordance with SMD wit hout incur ring the many difficu lt issues faced in ICAP design (C ha nd ley and Hogan. 2002) . A pre ferred so lution would be to allow prices to clear the energy and reserve markets (so that scarcity costs are properl y sig na led)" while a llow ing fina ncia l hed ging co ntrac ts and dem and -side measur es. According to Cha nd ley and Hogan , FERC sho uld not mandate the replace ment of ICAP mechanism whil e totally di scourage a market -clearing alterna tive for reserve capaci ty mar kets.
PJM has then been loo kin g to modi fy its ICAP sys tem by developin g a new methodol ogy for pea k load obligation, and by cha ngi ng the month-ahead and day-ahead markets to a pri ce-tak er auctio n whi le retaining mandatory pa rticipation in the day-ah ead market. Likew ise , the ISO New Eng land proposed a new location al install ed capaci ty (LICAP) mark et since the ca paci ty markets in New Eng land we re registering at certain times prices of zero while ge nerat ion in constrained areas needed to be va lue d more highl y 30 Joskow and Tirol e (2004) theoretic ally show that the ineffi cient dispat ch o f resources procur ed by the ISO in orde r to be used durin g reserve sca rc ity conditions wi ll lead in the long run to substitution of base load unit s by peak units. 3 I Thi s is of course confronted with the po litica l mot ivation to keep pric es low. However. from a strictly eco no mic poi nt of view, the experience in indu stries different from the electricity industry is that "the best cure for high prices is high prices" (Harvard Electric ity Po licy Gro up, 2003, p. IS). (Davis, 2004) .32 T he initial plan was to ex tend the day-ahead and real-t ime markets to inclu de reserve ava ilability bids. However, a prim ary difficult y was th at the marginal cost of providing reserves in suc h markets was neg ligib le (Cramton et al, 2005) . T he LICAP proposal included basing pric es in demand curves for Main e, Connec ticut metropolitan Boston , and the rest of New England. New prices are to be pha sed-i n through capped increments in a five-year period. These proposa ls we re initially opposed by LS Es and other co nsumers since -in the ir opi nion--they would only produce huge transfers fro m LSEs to genera tors, wi thout providing long-term incent ives to increase new ge neration (Davis, 2004) . However, the New Eng land ISO abandoned the original idea of extending the day-ahead and rea l-time markets to include reserve s, and proposed inste ad to price reserves in real time during shortage s (short age pricing) together with enhancing the forward reserve market for offli ne rese rves .. '3 T he LICAP market and the forward reserve market the n wo rk as complement s. LICAP reward s flexible reso urces, while the forward market provides co mpensations (based on location al prices) to reserve resources so that price reflects the eco nomics cost s of reserving supply.
CALL OPTIONS
As see n in the previous section, capacity requirements have the problem of artificially setting a capac ity leve l and the value of maintaining such a capacity. Call options are proposed as an altemative system that wo uld represent a more rea l va lue of capacity, and that bundles ge neration adequacy with price insura nce (Va zquez et ai, 2002) . T he desired ca pac ity is centrally determined , while price is decent rall y determined but co nsumers are hed ged against huge price spi kes (see figure J) . Typically, the sys tem operator wo uld purchase ca ll options from the generators in a competitive bidding proce ss that would co ver the desired capacity." Th e bu yer exercises the option if the spot price is gre ater than the strike price (and receives a premi um equal to the -' 2 Creti and Fabr a (2004) dedu ce from their theoret ical mod el the possibility that cap acity markets c lear at zero pr ices if there is no spread betwe en national and for eign pric es.
. '-' Rea l time short age prices are determi ned for each type of reserv es acco rdin g to a penalt y factor. A bo nus is pa id for most reserves for being available when most needed. Mea nwhi le, the forward reserve mar ket works according to auctions of offl ine reserve s. -' 4 Alterna tive ly. LSEs could be the bu yers of options through se lf-provision fro m their own co ntro lled reso urces. or thro ugh bil ateral contrac ts with ge ne rators .
differe nce between the spot price and the strike price) ." The strike price of options is used as a pr ice-cap in case of eme rge nci es , an d high penalties are imposed for fa ilure to de liver when the option is ca lled. Thi s ass ures that the promised capacity is rea lly made avai lable, espec ially duri ng the peak periods.
T he price cap of a ca ll options system works as a protection to co nsumers, which w ill ass ure that prices stay within a socia lly accepta ble range so that the regu latory inter venti on becomes a for m of insuranc e agai nst pri ce vo latility . Co mpared to the ICAP sys tem, the risk is now cha nged to the sys tem ope rator (o r the LSE ) that now bears the uncert ainty of whether the options are used o r not. Risk is remove d from ge nera tors that now face a more stab le revenue horizo n compared to an uncertain and volati le incom e for peak gen eration. The expected generators income for pri ces above the strike pr ice equals the price of the ca ll options, and generators now receive a fixed payment for the option. Pric es and corresponding capacity payments are then derived as market based prem ia from the market player s' strategies for risk management.
The provision of supply adequacy through LSE' s hedging obligations captures several important features (Ore n, 2003) . If the LSE obligations are adjusted (say) mont hly to retlect tluctuation s in foreca sted peak demand, a secondary market for call options shou ld emerge that wou ld permit the trading of options among LSEs. However, while secondary markets permit the LSEs to adjust the ir positions eac h month, price volati lity in suc h markets increases the LSEs risk. Hed g ing should then be treated as anot her ancillary serv ice, a llowi ng LSEs se lf provision thr ough bilateral co ntrac ts with the ISO act as a provider of last reso rt. The dan ger is of course that this may inter fere with incenti ves in the contrac t market, and be perceived by LSE s as an alterna tive to prud ent risk m an agemen t.
In co untr ies lacking we ll-deve lope d financia l markets, LSEs or ge nerators may assume more risk than they ca n handl e rel iably." In particular, LSEs m igh t not be able to manage risk in a soc ially optimal way, }; Th e strike pric e of a ca ll option is the contractual pr ice at whi ch the und erl ier (i.e. the valuers) from wh ic h a deri vati ve derives its va lue ) will be purchased in the eve nt that the option is exe rcised. Th e buyers of the ca ll option may choo se the strike pric e tha t suits their risk aver sion : high (low ) st rike prices have sma ll (h igh ) prem iums. Option prem ium s a lso wor k as subs titute efficient signa ls compare d to pri ce signals ge ne rated by ICAP s (Si ng h. 2002 ). . ,6 Likew ise. the ca p ital market might not be able to provid e the long terrn financin g for ge ne ration investm ent s co mme ns urate to the associa ted risk. Thi s combined with inexp eri enc e with commodity trading in the e lectri city indu stry --and the perc eived regulatory risk--mi ght raise the co st of capi tal so much that the investment level will be far below than the need ed fo r an efficient resource adequacy level (Oren , 2003) .
so that the regul at or should need to se t a m nu rnum co ntrac ti ng or hed g ing level on LSEs. T hen agai n, this wo uld lead to non-market arbit rariness. A ca ll-option mech anism has been designed for the electricity market in Co lombia (Vazquez et a l, 2002) . The regulator requires the system ope rator to buy a prescribed vo lume of reliab ility contracts that a llow co ns umers to get a ma rket co mpatible price cap in exc hange for a fixe d capacity remuneration for ge nerators . T his entitles co nsumers to enoug h ava ilable ge neratio n ca pac ity . Reliability co ntracts then con sist of a co mbination o f a finan cial ca ll option w ith a high strike pri ce, and an ex plicit pen alt y for ge nerators in case of nondeli ver y..'? T he regul ator ca rries out a yea rly aucti on o f option co ntrac ts and sets the strike pri ce (at least 25% above the variable cost of the most expensive generator) and the vo lume of capacity to be auctio ned (in te rms of the expected peak demand and the avai lab le ins talled ca pacity). However, ge nerators decide how to divide their total ca pacity into d ifferent blocks (fir m, less-fir m, new entra nts, and least-firm) and how to price eac h block, so that ca pacity ass igne d to eac h ge nerator is a mar ket result and not the outco me of an administrati ve process. This proposal is very se ns itive to mark et power. Therefore, its impl em entation requires that the maximum amount that a ge nerator ca n bid is limited to its nominal cap acit y, that portfoli o bidding is not allo wed , and that the winning bid s ca nnot tran sfer their obliga tions of physical deli very to ot her ge nera tors .
CO NCL USIONS
T his pa pe r has surveyed the co ntributions to the literature o n supply adequacy in elec tric ity mar kets. We studie d the different ex isting appro ac hes, and describ ed their ana lytica l properti es and impl em entation charac te ristics. In assessing the different alt ernatives, the trend in the liter ature is to look for some kind of tran sit ory regul ato ry inter vention that gra nts resource ade quacy . Ca paci ty obligations or ca pac ity payme nts can mainl y be useful if hourly meterin g, hourl y pri cing, an d demand bidding are inad equ ate, and ca nnot be implem ented ex pe ditious ly. Ot herw ise , ma ny believe that the ene rgy and the reserve markets should not be separated (Hunt, 2002) . T he ideal wo uld then be an ISO (which run s day -a hea d and spot markets ) that takes ca re of imb alances and reaches eq uilibrium of all elec tr icity mar kets in an integr ated way. Ma rket playe rs wo uld meet their long run ex pe ctations for the dem andsupply balan ce in we ll-developed forward and futures market s. Energy and reserve pricin g would tak e care of supply ade quacy. Th is last approach relies . , 7 When the market price p is greater than the strike price s, and the generator is unab le to hon or its obligation to produce. the ge nerator will have to pay an additional pen alty pen (apart from the difference p -s) . The additional penalty is intended to discourage even more bid s not backed by reliable capacity.
on the view that capacity mec hanis ms are designed for e lectricity marke ts that miss a fundamenta l central issue: if regulators set the ty pe, level and location of capacity leve ls and payments there will not be much left for markets to do. A ll that would be left is co mpeti tive procuremen t, very much like what is done through traditi onal reg ulation. In practice, however, e lectricity markets are usually impl em en ted togeth er with tran sitory reso urce-a de quacy measur es, but capac ity payment s and requi rement s alone have been found to present severa l inconve niences both in theo ry and practice. In the case of capac ity payment s. Arge ntina abando ned them because they negati vely affected the financial situatio n of gene rato rs, while they we re man ipulated by large players in the U K. In seve ral other countries. they led to create inefficient peaking p lants, artificially prom oted the use of a certain fue l, and distorted the structure of production incentivesid ur ing cr isis of deficit supp ly. Addi tiona lly, experience has show n that the calc ulation of the level of capacity pay ments does not follow the long run logic needed for investments in capacity reserves. Likewise, it is a subjective task that could be susceptible to political manipu lation, and that very much depends on the technological plant composition. Notwithstan ding its inconveniences , the capacity payment system combi ned wit h a pool design has shown to provide better incentives in the UK and Australia for investments in generation reserves compared to NETA, PJM and Nordpoo l.
With regards to capacity requ irement mechanisms, practice has show n that they do not provid e adeq uate inves tment signals , and that they have been subjec t to market manipulation, have not prom oted the building of new ge neration facilit ies, and have led to ineffi cient distorti on s whe n they inter act with sys tems w ithout capac ity requirement s. In PJM, for ex ample, they led to seve ral pric e spikes wh en owners of capacity inc reased their ex po rts as ex terna l pr ices surpassed the PJM market prices. In N ew York , the ICAP sys tem was not able to genera te ince ntives to attract generating capac ity that guara ntee d resource ade quacy because sca rcity ren ts were too low co m pare d to the cos t of building peaking capa city. T he LICA P pro posa l for New England was origina lly op posed for its lack of long-term ince ntives to increase capacity reserves, an d beca use it represented a rent transfer from LSE s to ge nerators. Even FERC proposed resource adequacy req uirements based on long-term contracting measures. Simi lar to capacity payments, capacity requirement mec hanisms are usually derived from shor t-term adequacy concerns rather than long -term, and the calculation of an optimal capacity level is subjective as well.
However, the ISO New Engla nd has recently proposed capacity reserve market that more or less combi nes capacity req uirements and paymen ts, as we ll as for war d markets. The or iginal proposal of ex te nding the day-ahead and real-time mark ets to include reser ves was abando ned. Th e new proposal is to pri ce reserves in real tim e during shortages togeth er w ith developing a forw ard reserve market for offli ne reserves. T he L1 CAP market and the forwa rd reserve are then co mbined in such a way that L1 CAP rewa rds flexibl e resources, whil e the forwa rd market remunerates o ffline rese rve resources. This is an interestin g proposal that see ms to extrac t the virtues of both the capacity requirement and ca pacity paym ent methods.
Th e mo st advanc ed dev elopment s in the literature point to the use of an alt ernative sys tem based on some type of hedging instruments such as call options. Capac ity paym ent s or requirement s would work efficiently wh en combine d with risk management approa ches and hed ging instrum ent s that promote dem and side parti cipation. Regul atory inter vent ion wo uld then be focu sed on promoting rul es that facil itate liquid markets for energy futures and risk man agem ent. In any case, eve n tough so me see resource ade quacy requirem ent s as artificial policies that suppress market signals and retard market development, they could also be und erstood as positive measures th at, if effective, could pre vent gove rn ments from severely costl y policy reversals (as the co stly policy rev er sal s in Ca lifornia and Ont ario) that could occur in the absenc e of an y supply requirement. O' X. , 1985 1986 1987 193B 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 19% 1996 1997 1998 1999 ( I) Portugal. Ital y. Denmark and the Ne the rla nds not incl ude d.
Annex
(2) Aus tralia not included . ( I ) Difference bet we en average reserves in the five ye ars before liberal izat ion and ave ra ge reser ves from ye ar of liberal ization to ye ar 2000 , (2) Average fo ur yea rs befo re liberalization in 1994 , (3 ) Ave rag e three years before liberal izatio n in 1998.
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The Capacity Pa ym ent Model Let us fir st study a simple sty lize d vers io n a capacity-pa yment model. Ass ume that the inverse dem and functio n at a peak period has the for m:
where P(Q ) is the inverse demand function, Q is the amount of electricity generated, ({ > 0 and b > 0 are positive constants, and k > 0 is a factor added to the price of electricity durin g peak periods.f
. 18 k would ther efo re con tain term s such as "cfa lla" and "kfactot" of the 1999 Mex ican reform proposa l (see Ca rreo n-Rodrig uez and Rosellon, 2002 ).
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We ass ume there are only two firm s, firm I and firm 2 . We then have Q = q , + 'l : (w here (j, and q 2 are the amounts of e lectr icity generated by firm 1 and firm 2, respectively ). T he cost functions are for i = 1,2 (2) where ci is the margin al cos t of pow er ge neration for firm i = 1,2 . Suppose that c,< c2 . T he profit maximi zati on problem for firm i = 1,2 is the n 
T here fore, the net soc ial bene fit (equal to the su m of total profi ts plu s total co nsumer surplus ) is NSB = n I + n 2 + EC =~a2 (1 + k )2 -(c\ + c2 )[Sa(l + k ) + (C1+ c2 )]-36C\C2} I Sb(l +k)
Not e that that thi s expression is mainl y determ ined by the value of k (the term that artificia lly increases the pr ice of electricity) , and the marg ina l costs of eac h fir m.
The Regulated Standby Model
Let us no w form ally analyze the regulated standby model in which excess dem and is satisfied in a reserve (or standby ) market. Now firm I is a monopol y in th e pool market, whil e firm 2 is a lso a monopo ly operating in the reserve market. Fi rm 2 onl y tak es care of excess demand.
Firm l ' s inverse demand fun ction is give n by (8) and its cost fun cti on is
Th e pro fit maximization pro blem of firm I is then:
{II (Ii
In thi s case, the eq ui librium qu antity and pri ce are Firm 2 onl y ope rates to sat isfy excess dem and at peak period s. This firm faces an inver se dem and function of the form : 
Now, assu ming c 1 <c~(fir ms in the pool are more efficient tha n the firms in the reserve mark et) , we ge t 
Comparison of the Capacity Paym ent and Sta ndby Models
Once we have obtained the equilibri um va lues for qu antiti es, prices, pr ofits, consume r surplus and net soc ia l benefits in both models, it is possibl e to co mpare und er what cond itions one policy is superior to the other. For this purpose, we wi ll ass ume that ge nerato rs in the ca paci ty-payment and the standby mod el s face the same cos t and demand fun ction s, that is 
w hi le consumer sur plus in the standby model is grea ter than consumer surplus und er the ca paci ty-pay ment mod el if Give n that c 1 ( c 2 , it is ev ident fro m these equati ons that profits, consumer sur plus and net soc ial benefits are greater und er the standby mod el tha n und er the "capac ity paym ent " model the greater is the value of (C2 -Cl)' That is, the standby mod el provid es better social and pri vate outco mes for economies wh ere the margin al cost difference between mod ern and old plant s is large enoug h.
Moreover, both mod els ca n also be compa red in term s of implied elec tric ity prices. According to (22) , th e equi librium reserve-market pr ice in th e standby mod el is greater than the corres ponding spot pri ce. How ever, what is the relation between the form er price and the equilibrium pr ice of the ca paci ty-pay ment mod el?
It can be show n that p * (q I + q2 ) + !1p * (qI + q2 ) > j/ (q 2 ) + !1j / (q 2 ) (25) wh en ever the differen ce (C2-c \ ) IS suffic iently large. That IS, impl ementation of a byp ass reserve mark et makes social sense in terms of prices onl y if there is a large efficiency ga p between old and new ge neration plant s. In suc h a case, the impl ement ation of the capacity-pay ment so lution wou ld only create an artific ially high rent that could pro vid e incenti ves for development of oligopoly ge nerat ion mark ets.
